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The Delaware Death Penalty:
An Empirical Study†
Sheri Lynn Johnson, John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, Valerie P. Hans
& Martin T. Wells
We are grateful for the invitation to participate in a symposium that
honors a great scholar and great man, a quiet man with a strong passion
for justice, Professor David C. Baldus. David was deeply admired in the
academic community in which all of us participate, but in the death penalty
litigation community to which two of us, John and Sheri, belong, he was
almost worshipped. Unlike many experts, whom capital defense lawyers
sometimes try to cajole, bully, or buy, David was valued for his steadfast
pursuit of the facts. We knew from the start that he was going to track down
the truth, and then tell it.
In fact, the reverence for his work, as well as his integrity, may be why in
the death penalty litigation community he was known as “David” rather
than “Dave”; the nickname would have seemed insufficiently respectful.
That reverence did not, however, make David self-important. When Sheri
first met David at Airlie (where he was presenting his findings to a group of
death penalty litigators), he just introduced himself by his first name, talked
about what he was working on, asked her ideas, and inquired about her
own work. Later, someone whispered to her, “Did you know that was David
Baldus?” and she was embarrassed to have been so unmindful of his stature

† Financial support for this research project was provided by the Cornell Death Penalty
Project, http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/death-penalty-project/About.cfm, and by
Cornell Law School’s faculty research funds to Valerie Hans. This paper benefited from helpful
audience feedback at Northwestern University Law School’s Rosenthal Lectures (Eisenberg and
Johnson); a presentation to Delaware lawyers (Johnson), a presentation to Delaware’s Superior
Court judges (Hans), the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Blume), the American Bar
Foundation (Hans), and the Law & Society Association conference (Hans).
 James and Mark Flanagan Professor of Law and Assistant Director, Death Penalty
Project, Cornell Law School.
 Professor of Law; Director of Clinical, Advocacy and Skills Programs; and Director,
Death Penalty Project, Cornell Law School.
 Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences,
Cornell University.
 Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
 Charles A. Alexander Professor of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University.
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while spouting her half-baked theories. As it turns out, that was a common
experience; three other people told her similar stories. If David knew how
monumental his contribution was, he never let on. He just kept on.
But it was monumental. As Ted and Valerie, who are co-editors of the
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, observed, no empirical study has
had as great an impact on the law in this country as David Baldus’s project
analyzing Georgia’s death penalty sentencing regime. Its extraordinary
influence is particularly remarkable given that it did not produce a legal
victory.1 Even though the Georgia study featured unparalleled
sophistication and detail, the Court disparaged the significance of those
findings in McCleskey v. Kemp.2
Not content with one monumental contribution, David kept on. He
refined his methodology and continued to work on analyzing the operation
of the death penalty in other jurisdictions. David’s painstaking work on the
Pennsylvania death penalty, where he added blind independent ratings of
aggravation and mitigation—and found even larger race effects—set a
standard that has not yet been matched, or even approached. The same can
be said for his work on the death penalty in other states, as well as on the
death penalty in the military. What follows does not meet the standard
David set. Were he here, he would no doubt urge us to wait until the last
part of our study is complete and our analysis more refined to publish
anything. But we publish this now in acknowledgement of the vast
influence he had on this study,3 and over much of our past work. We are
grateful for his lead and are grateful to have known him.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1928
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DELAWARE DEATH PENALTY........................ 1929
II. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................... 1932
A. THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS DATABASE ............................... 1932
B. THE FBI SUPPLEMENTAL HOMICIDE REPORTS ................................. 1933
C. THE DELAWARE CAPITAL TRIALS DATABASE ................................... 1935

1. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). There is some reason, however, to hope
that it will eventually do so. Justice Powell, the author of and fifth vote in McCleskey, later
expressed his regret. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994). The only other
case in which Powell regretted his vote, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), has since been
reversed by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Should the day come when McCleskey too is
relegated to the dustbin of history, much of credit will be due to David’s pioneering work.
2. McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279.
3. David’s influence on this study was not merely inspirational. He generously gave us
coding instruments he used when studying other states. We adapted his coding instrument for
use in Delaware.
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INTRODUCTION
For the last five years, we have conducted an empirical study of the
“modern era” of capital punishment in Delaware. By “modern era,” we refer
to the time period after the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v.
Georgia,4 which invalidated all then-existing state death penalty regimes.
Some readers might ask, “Why Delaware?” They might observe that it is a
small state and is not a significant national player in terms of death
sentences imposed or death row inmates executed. While both are true,
several features of Delaware’s capital punishment system intrigue us. First,
Delaware has a high death sentencing rate. Prior studies revealed that in
relation to the number of murders, Delaware has the third-highest death
sentencing rate in the United States.5 Studying the Delaware experience
allows us to explore the factors that may account for the relatively high rate
of capital punishment in the state. Second, it is not a Southern state. Most
(though not all) previous empirical studies have focused on Southern
jurisdictions.6 Third, Delaware has used jury sentencing as well as different
judge-sentencing schemes in capital cases. Studies of judge versus jury death
penalty sentencing have typically compared decision-makers across
jurisdictions, or have examined judicial overrides of jury decisions within a
state.7 Comparison of Delaware’s capital trial experiences under these
diverse sentencing approaches offers a rare opportunity to contrast the
operation of jury and judge capital sentencing within a single state. Finally,
no previous systematic empirical studies of the death penalty in Delaware
have been conducted. Thus, for both theoretical and practical reasons, we
determined that it would be a worthwhile capital punishment jurisdiction to
examine.
In this Article we present our findings to date.8 After reviewing the
modern history of the Delaware death penalty and describing our
4. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Explaining Death Row’s Population
and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 172 (2004).
6. See, e.g., John H. Blume, Twenty-Five Years of Death: A Report of the Cornell Death Penalty
Project on the “Modern” Era of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 54 S.C. L. REV. 285 (2002).
7. See Blume et al., supra note 5, at 177–78 (comparing states with judge versus jury
sentencing schemes); William J. Bowers, Wanda D. Foglia, Jean E. Giles & Michael E. Antonio,
The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical Examination of the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury
Influence Death Penalty Decision-Making, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2006) (contrasting the
views and experiences of capital jurors in jury sentencing states versus states with hybrid judge–
jury sentencing systems); Christopher Slobogin, The Death Penalty in Florida, 1 ELON L. REV. 17,
47–50 (2009) (describing problems with Florida’s judicial override of jury sentencing
recommendations in capital cases).
8. This Article presents our findings on the cases in which death was sought in Delaware.
We anticipate follow-up articles that examine these cases in more detail. Although it is
challenging to obtain full information on homicide cases that do not proceed to capital trial, it
would also be of substantial interest to examine the state’s selection of cases in which to seek
the death penalty from the universe of death-eligible cases.
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methodology, we will describe our findings regarding geographical patterns,
racial disparities, judge–jury sentencing differences, and reversal rates. We
leave to others to discuss what, if any, legal or policy implications might arise
from our findings.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DELAWARE DEATH PENALTY

As noted above, in 1972, the Supreme Court effectively held in Furman
that the death penalty, as then administered in the United States, violated
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.9 Like most
jurisdictions, the death penalty statute in existence in Delaware at the time
of Furman required the jury to decide the issues of guilt and punishment in
the same unitary proceedings and provided no standards for the jury to
utilize in making the life-or-death decision.10 In 1973, in State v. Dickerson,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Delaware scheme was invalid
under Furman.11
The Delaware legislature quickly enacted a new capital punishment
statute.12 Since Dickerson interpreted Furman as forbidding “the uncontrolled
discretion of juries and judges in imposing the death penalty,”13 the 1974
Delaware statute called for mandatory death sentences for anyone convicted
of first-degree murder.14 The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the new law
in State v. Sheppard,15 and the death penalty in Delaware was back in business.
Over the next two years, nine individuals were sentenced to death under the
mandatory regime.16
But Delaware had backed the wrong constitutional horse. In 1976, the
Supreme Court held in Woodson v. North Carolina17 and Roberts v. Louisiana18
that mandatory capital-sentencing schemes violated the Eighth Amendment.
In State v. Spence, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded, as it had to, that

9. Furman, 480 U.S. 238.
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3901 (1953). In 1958, Delaware abolished capital
punishment. Death Row FAQs, DELAWARE.GOV, http://doc.delaware.gov/information/deathrow_
history.shtml (last updated Feb. 2, 2012). It was the second state to do so. Id. In 1961, however,
the Delaware legislature reinstated capital punishment. Id. Then-Governor Elbert Carvel vetoed
the legislation, but the legislature overrode the veto. Id.
11. State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761 (Del. 1973). For a list of the nine defendants whose
death sentences were overturned in Dickerson, see infra Appendix A.
12. 59 Del. Laws 943 (1974) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 636,
4209 (2011)).
13. Loren C. Meyers & Gayle P. Lafferty, Capital Punishment, in DELAWARE SUPREME
COURT: GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951–2001, at 179 (Randy J. Holland & Helen L. Winslow eds.,
2001).
14. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 59, § 284 (1974).
15. State v. Sheppard, 331 A.2d 142 (Del. 1974).
16. See State v. Spence, 367 A.2d 983, 986 (Del. 1976).
17. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
18. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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the 1974 scheme did not pass constitutional muster and set aside all nine
sentences imposed under that scheme.19
In May 1977, the legislature enacted a new law modeled after the
Georgia capital-sentencing statute upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976 in
Gregg v. Georgia.20 This scheme provided for a bifurcated trial at which the
defendant’s guilt or innocence would be decided in the first phase. If the
defendant was convicted, the jury would then determine the appropriate
punishment in a separate sentencing proceeding.21 The new system allowed
for the presentation of aggravating and mitigating evidence at the penalty
phase.22 The jury could only sentence the defendant to death if it
unanimously concluded that the prosecution had proven, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance.23 The jury’s decision to sentence the defendant to death had
to be unanimous and the jury’s sentence determination was binding on the
judge.24 The new scheme also provided for automatic appellate review by the
Delaware Supreme Court to determine “whether the evidence supported the
finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, whether imposition of the
death penalty was arbitrary or capricious, and whether the death sentence
was proportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.”25 Finally, the
1977 statute required preparation of the entire trial transcript, specific
identification of the aggravating circumstances found by the jury, a complete
report by the trial judge, and “administrative assistance in compiling
information on the universe of cases to be reviewed by the Court in
performing its proportionality review.”26 The Delaware Supreme Court
concluded the new regime satisfied the Eighth Amendment in State v.
White.27
The jury-sentencing regime was in place from 1977 until 1991. In
October of 1991, a New Castle County jury decided the highly publicized
case of four African-American men from outside the state who, in the
process of committing a robbery of a Brooks armored car in Wilmington,
fatally shot the two Brooks guards.28 The jury convicted all four defendants,
19. Spence, 367 A.2d at 988.
20. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
21. State v. White, 395 A.2d 1082, 1086 (Del. 1978).
22. Meyers & Lafferty, supra note 13, at 181–82.
23. Id. at 182.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing White, 395 A.2d at 1092–96).
27. White, 395 A.2d at 1097 (holding that the 1977 statute was constitutional, “except for
the aggravating circumstances identified as ‘elderly’ and ‘defenseless’ victims . . . which
provisions are declared unconstitutional and are severed from the Statute”).
28. See Robertson v. State, 630 A.2d 1084, 1086–87 (Del. 1993). For a detailed account of
the public response to the case and its importance in the effort to reduce the jury’s role in
Delaware’s capital-sentencing scheme, see Benjamin D. Fleury-Steiner, Kerry Dunn & Ruth
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Kenneth Rodgers, James Llewellyn, Christopher Long, and Paul Robertson,
and a penalty hearing ensued. After a short deliberation of two and a half
hours, the jury could not agree unanimously on the death penalty for any of
the men. So, all four were sentenced to life in prison without probation or
parole.29 Responding to the public outcry, the Delaware legislature amended
the death penalty statute in November of 1991 to eliminate jury
sentencing.30 Under the new scheme, modeled after Florida’s capital
punishment system, the jury’s recommendation of death was no longer
binding on the trial judge; the court, not the jury, was vested with ultimate
sentencing authority.31 The Delaware Supreme Court in State v. Cohen
upheld the new judge-sentencing system.32 Finding the change merely
procedural, the Court also upheld the new statute against a challenge that
that the new regime could not be used in capital trials where the crime
occurred prior to the enactment of the new law.33
Delaware’s current capital punishment scheme was enacted in 2002.
Earlier that year, the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona.34
In Ring, the Court held that the factors that made a defendant eligible for
the death penalty, such as the elements of capital murder or the statutory
aggravating circumstances, had to be found by a jury.35 Thus, in July 2002,
the Delaware legislature again revised the method for determining how
defendants are sentenced to death.36
The current system retains the jury’s advisory sentencing role as to
whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, but
requires that a jury must unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt find
at least one statutory aggravating circumstance.37 While the ultimate
sentencing power still resides with the judge,38 the Delaware Supreme Court
has determined that the trial judge must give “appropriate consideration”39
to a jury’s assessment of whether aggravation outweighs mitigation:
The jury’s recommendation concerning whether the aggravating
circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating
Fleury-Steiner, Governing Through Crime as Commonsense Racism, 11 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 5,
11–15 (2009).
29. Robertson, 630 A.2d at 1086.
30. Fleury-Steiner et al., supra note 28, at 15.
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2011); State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846 (Del. 1992); see
Meyers & Lafferty, supra note 13, at 177.
32. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846.
33. Id. In six of the seven cases combined in Cohen, the murders had occurred before the
1991 amendments were passed into legislation. Id.
34. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
35. Id. at 609.
36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 345 (Del. 2003).
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circumstances found to exist shall be given such consideration as
deemed appropriate by the Court in light of the particular
circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the
character and propensities of the offender as found to exist by the
Court. The jury’s recommendation shall not be binding upon the
Court.40
II. METHODOLOGY
To examine capital punishment in Delaware, our project relies on three
different sets of data. To place Delaware’s experience with its capital
punishment system in a national context, we employed two national
databases. The first is a Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”) database, Capital
Punishment in the United States, which includes defendants sentenced to
death during the time period of 1973–2007.41 A second national dataset is
the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports (“SHR”), which provide data
about murders nationwide.42 Finally, we developed the Delaware Capital
Trials dataset based on our research team’s coding of the information in
legal documents as well as in homicide case files in the offices of the
Delaware Prothonotary and in the Delaware Archives, supplemented by
information from news coverage and Delaware judges and attorneys.
A. THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS DATABASE
The BJS database “Capital Punishment in the United States” tracks
every person sentenced to death from 1973 to 2007.43 To avoid the effects
of early uncertainty in the post-Furman44 modern death penalty era, the
sample is limited to defendants sentenced after 1976, when the Supreme
Court in Gregg v. Georgia established the foundation for the modern death
penalty era.45 The BJS data contain 8701 observations, 7603 of which are
40. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1). Previously, judges were required to give “great
weight” to the jury’s recommendation. Garden v. State, 844 A.2d 311, 314, 318 (Del. 2004)
(remanding where a Superior Judge failed to give “great weight” to the jury’s recommendation
of life and the jury’s recommendation of life was supportable); Garden, 815 A.2d at 342–43.
(remanding where a Superior Judge gave substantial consideration to the jury’s
recommendation of life, but instead imposed a sentence of death). The Delaware legislature
subsequently revised the language in 2003 to require only “such consideration as deemed
appropriate.” 74 Del. Laws 425 (2003).
41. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1973–2007 (2009) [hereinafter BJS dataset], available at http://icpsr.umich.
edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/24961.
42. JAMES A. FOX & MARC L. SWATT, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS [UNITED STATES]:
SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS, WITH MULTIPLE IMPUTATION, CUMULATIVE FILES, 1976–
2007 (2000), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/24801.
43. BJS dataset, supra note 41.
44. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
45. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Court approved several new death penalty
statutes after Gregg, on the ground that they addressed the problems of arbitrariness and
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death sentences imposed from 1977 to 2007, inclusive. Federal death
sentences and death sentences in New York’s never-fully-implemented
modern capital punishment system are excluded.46 Those individuals who
entered the death row data set, exited from it (perhaps because of a
favorable court decision), and then reentered the sample are limited to one
observation. This leaves a sample of 7109 individual state death row
defendants from thirty-six states with capital punishment. The BJS death row
data include the state, year of sentence, year of arrest, race of the defendant,
and other information.47
B. THE FBI SUPPLEMENTAL HOMICIDE REPORTS
The FBI SHR contains information on the vast majority of murders in
the United States.48 Using murder data and comparing it to capital
prosecutions or death sentences measures the “death-proneness” of a state’s
entire criminal justice process.
For each murder, the data include the year of the offense, the race, sex,
age of the victim and of the defendant arrested for the offense, the county in
which the offense occurred, and data about the nature of the murder,
including whether it was committed in the course of certain crimes such as
robbery, rape, burglary, or larceny.49 Crime analysts have concluded that
discrimination identified in Furman. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (finding
Texas’ death penalty system constitutional); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (finding
Florida’s death penalty statute constitutional). New Jersey’s post-Furman death penalty statute
became effective in 1982, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2011), New Mexico’s in 1979, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A) (2009), and Oregon’s in 1978, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095(e) (2009).
46. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004).
47. An alternative source of death row inmate information is the NAACP’s Death Row
U.S.A. The NAACP data also do not contain the race of victim for those inmates on death row
who have not been executed. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND., INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A.
(Winter 2011), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/DRUSA_Winter_
2011.pdf. The NAACP list does not include a cumulative listing of all those who have entered
death row. The BJS list has been said to miscount commutations. See Michael L. Radelet &
Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289,
292 n.12 (1993). But the discrepancy seems minimal in revised BJS data. Hugo Adam Bedau,
Background and Developments, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 25
n.26 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997).
48. FOX & SWATT, supra note 42.
49. Id. For a discussion of the quality of the SHR data, see generally James Alan Fox &
Marc L. Swatt, Multiple Imputation of the Supplementary Homicide Reports, 1976–2005, 25 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 51 (2009). For Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, and Montana, SHR data
were missing for one or more years of this study. For Florida we used the number of murders
from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for the years 1989 through 2007. Florida
Statewide Murders by Firearm, FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2012), www.fdle.state.fl.us/
Content/getdoc/332e1b3d-2648-4b06-8be5-d322f340c95d/1971_fwd_murder_firearms.aspx.
For 1988, we used the average number of murders for the two surrounding years, 1987 and
1989. Id. To estimate the number of murders in Kansas for the years 1999 through 2000, we
used information from the Disaster Center. Kansas Crime Rates 1960–2010, THE DISASTER
CENTER, http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/kncrime.htm (last visited May, 8, 2012). The
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despite some imperfections, the murder data are among the most reliable
crime data.50
The SHR include unsolved homicides, and recent iterations of the data
include imputed information for missing data.51 In this study, we use the
non-imputed data. The non-imputed data have been reported to contain
approximately 90% of murders, with some variation over time.52 If the data
lack the offender’s sex, we treat the case as unsolved, as not producing a
candidate for the death sentence, and eliminate it from the death sentence
rate calculations.53 To the extent that arrests are followed by releases, the
data overstate the number of offenders at risk of a death sentence. Since the
primary purpose for which we use the SHR data is to facilitate interstate
comparisons, rather than to ascertain the absolute level of death sentence
rates, erroneous murder arrests are of concern only to the extent they vary
unevenly across states.
The SHR data allow for reasonable estimates of the number of solved
murders in each state in each year. For comparison with the 1977 to 2007
death row population data, we use the SHR for 1976 through 2007, except
for Kansas, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, and South Dakota. Kansas’s
post-Furman death penalty statute became effective in 1994.54 New Jersey’s
post-Furman death penalty statute became effective in 1982.55 New Mexico’s
data were adjusted to reflect differences in the Kansas source data and the SHR data for the
years in which SHR data were available. For Kentucky we used the average of SHR-reported
murders for 1987 and 1989 to estimate the number of murders in 1988. For Montana, we used
the average of SHR reported murders for 1986 and 1988 to estimate the number of murders in
1987 and the average of SHR reported murders for 1995 and 1997 to estimate the number of
murders in 1996.
50. See John J. Donohue, Understanding the Time Path of Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1423, 1425 (1998); John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources
Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1998);
Robert J. Cottrol, Hard Choices and Shifted Burdens: American Crime and American Justice at the End
of the Century, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 517 (1997) (book review). But see Michael Maxfield,
Circumstances in Supplementary Homicide Reports: Variety and Validity, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 671, 675–81
(1989). The data exclude negligent manslaughters and justifiable homicides. FOX & SWATT,
supra note 42.
51. FOX & SWATT, supra note 42.
52. Id. at 53.
53. Offender sex is missing for 26.8% of SHR observations after 1976, with a low of 21.1%
in 1978 and a high of 30.2% in 1992. These rates are reasonably consistent with a report of
unsolved homicides ranging from just below 20% in 1976 to just over 30% in the mid-1990s.
Id. at 54. Missing data for unsolved murders are not a concern for this study because unsolved
murders do not produce candidates for death row.
54. Kansas, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/kansas-1 (last
visited June 30, 2012).
55. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (2005); New Jersey, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-jersey-1 (last visited June 30, 2012). New Jersey abolished capital
punishment in late 2007, largely after the period covered by this study. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:113b (2008); Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/17/nyregion/17cnd-jersey.html.
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and South Dakota’s became effective in 1979,56 and Oregon’s became
effective in 1978.57 For these states, we limit the SHR murder data to the
years corresponding to the potential exposure of murder defendants to the
death penalty.58
By comparing death row sizes with murder populations, one can
estimate states’ relative propensities to impose the death penalty. Murder is
clearly the crime category from which the vast majority of death sentences
emerge. In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in Kennedy v. Louisiana that the
death penalty is unconstitutional for child rape and for other crimes that do
not result in the death of the victim.59 Even before Kennedy, capital
punishment in non-murder cases was rare.
C. THE DELAWARE CAPITAL TRIALS DATABASE
The database contains information from Superior Court files at the
Delaware Archives and the Prothonotary’s offices in all three counties.
Trained coders went through the files on site and used a detailed
questionnaire, adapted from that used in David Baldus’s research, to code
over 700 elements of the cases, crimes, defendants, and victims.60 File
information was supplemented by other sources of information about the
cases, including Delaware trial and appellate court opinions, Third Circuit
and U.S. Supreme Court opinions, news reports, law review articles, and the
personal knowledge of Delaware judges and attorneys. The data include
basic case information (defendant name, dates of offense and proceedings,
attorneys and judges, trial and penalty-phase outcomes, and outcomes of
appellate proceedings); background information about the defendant and
the victim; presence or absence of potentially aggravating circumstances;

56. New Mexico abolished capital punishment in 2009, after the period covered by this
study. New Mexico, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-mexico-1
(last visited June 30, 2012); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14 (2009). For South Dakota, see
South Dakota, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/south-dakota-0 (last
visited June 30, 2012); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §23A-27A-1 to -44. (1979). Illinois abolished
capital punishment in 2011, also after the period covered by this study. Illinois, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/illinois-1 (last visited June 30, 2012); see also 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/119-1 (2012).
57. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095(e) (2001); Oregon, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/oregon-1 (last visited June 30, 2012).
58. In New Jersey, we use SHR data from 1982 through 2007. Oregon’s post-Furman
statute became effective on December 7, 1978, so we limit its SHR data to 1979 through 2007.
New Mexico’s post-Furman statute became effective July 1, 1979, so we limit its SHR data to
1980 through 2007.
59. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
60. DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A PULASKI, Jr., EQUAL JUSTICE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 512 (1990); see also David C. Baldus,
George Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Law and Statistics in Conflict: Reflections on
McCleskey v. Kemp, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 251 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer
eds., 1992).
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presence or absence of potentially mitigating circumstances; and written
case summaries that offer a narrative perspective on the case.61
III. GEOGRAPHY
We examined the distribution of death sentences by county and
observed some intriguing geographical patterns. Although the numbers are
small when cases and sentences are broken down by county and the
differences do not reach traditional levels of statistical significance, we
believe it’s important to describe the patterns we have observed. Twentynine persons (59% of the total) were sentenced to death in New Castle
County, fourteen (29%) were sentenced to death in Kent County, while only
six (12%) of the persons sentenced to death in the modern era under the
guided discretion statutes were sentenced to death in Sussex County.62
That New Castle County produces the most death sentences is not
surprising. It is by far the largest county and has the most murders. During
the time period 1976–2007, there were 753 murders in New Castle County
(67% of the state’s total).63 The Kent–Sussex disparity is more difficult to
explain, however. During the time period 1976–2007, the number of
murders in Sussex County (200, or 18% of the murders in the state)
exceeded the number in Kent County (178, or 16% of the total).64 But
capital trials and death sentences showed a reverse pattern.
Both a willingness to proceed with capital trials and the decisionmakers’ tendency to choose a death sentence appear to contribute to the
geographical pattern. According to the capital trial records obtained from
the State Prothonotary’s offices, Kent County had proportionately more
penalty-phase trials (twenty-eight overall) than might have been expected
given the homicide numbers, and half of those resulted in death

61. Despite excellent cooperation from the Delaware Superior Court and the
Prothonotary’s offices that house and manage the Superior Court files, obtaining accurate and
complete information for the defendants in the database has presented challenges. The case
files vary in their completeness. Police reports, especially valuable because they frequently
include race information, are often missing. The death cases are the most complete and the
most accurate, in part because death cases are automatically appealed, and as part of the review
process, the penalty-phase hearing is transcribed in its entirety. Post-trial litigation of death
cases is extensive, and we are able to cross-check case-file information with judicial reports and
appellate opinions. Information about the nature of the crime and the defendant’s background
is less well-developed in the files of life cases.
62. The numbers would be even more stark were it not for the fact that four of the last five
individuals sentenced to death in Delaware involved crimes that occurred in Sussex County. See
infra Appendix A. Prior to 2007, there had been only two Sussex County death cases. See infra
Appendix A. In our initial analyses and talks to the Delaware bar, we reported the very low
numbers.
63. FOX & SWATT, supra note 42. According to the Supplementary Homicide Reports,
from 1976 to 2007, Kent County had 178 murders, New Castle County had 753 murders, and
Sussex County had 200 murders. Id.
64. Id.
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sentences.65 The other two counties appeared to be less likely than might
have been expected, based on the homicide numbers, to proceed to full
capital trials; furthermore, judges and juries in New Castle and Sussex
counties selected death sentences in only about one-third of the cases.
Other traditional county characteristics that explain geographic
disparity are also missing. Delaware has a single elected Attorney General,
who then appoints the State Prosecutor and the County Prosecutors,66 and it
uses a centralized system for determining whether to seek death in a
particular case. Thus, the answer is not likely to be found in differences in
the death-seeking behavior of elected county prosecutors, as has been the
case in some other states.
Sussex County has a smaller African-American population than Kent
(12.7% v. 24%),67 and the average incomes and education levels, factors
that have been noted in other studies to explain geographical differences in
death sentencing, are not significantly different.68 In short, Kent County has
16% of the state’s murders, but produces 29% of the state’s death sentences.
New Castle County has 67% of the state’s murders and 59% of the state’s
death sentences. Sussex County has 18% of the state’s murders, but, as
noted above, only six persons (12% of the death sentences) were sentenced
to death for crimes committed in Sussex County.
We perhaps should not overanalyze the geographical patterns; because
of the small numbers, the differences across counties do not reach
traditional levels of statistical significance. Nonetheless, they raise the
possibility that homicides in the three counties could be qualitatively
different. Alternatively, or in addition, there may be distinctive local cultures
in the three Delaware counties with respect to the death penalty. We have

65. The analysis was limited to capital trials that proceeded to a penalty phase between
1976 and 2007. Note that the two most recent Sussex County death sentences fall outside this
time frame. See infra Appendix A (Powell and Small). For this analysis, only the first trial or first
penalty hearing was counted in cases with multiple trials or penalty phases for the same
homicide (hence, the second trials or penalty phases for David Dawson, James Riley, and Frank
Whalen were not included in the calculations). However, the multiple trials of Steven Pennell
were included because they covered different homicides.
66. See Preventing Crime, STATE OF DEL., http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/crime/
crimeprevent.shtml (last updated Feb. 27, 2012) (explaining the organization of criminal
prosecution in Delaware).
67. See State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 17, 2012), http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/10000.html.
68. See Theodore Eisenberg, Death Sentence Rates and County Demographics: An Empirical
Study, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 348, 359 (2005). The median household income in Sussex County is
approximately $51,000 a year and the median income in Kent is approximately $53,000, while
the percentage of persons below the poverty level is 11.7% and 12.5%, respectively. State and
County Quickfacts, supra note 67. Similarly, the percentage of high school graduates (85.2%
Sussex, 84.9% Kent) and of persons with a bachelor’s degree or higher (21.2% Sussex, 20%
Kent) are also very similar. Id.
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no strong hypotheses for these geographical patterns but report them
because there may be others who do.
IV. RACE
The influence of race upon death sentences has been the subject of
many studies, including, of course, the extraordinary work of David Baldus.
Here, we report racial disparities measured in several ways.
A. DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED BY RACE
Fifty-eight persons—fifty-seven of them men69—have been sentenced to
death in the “modern” era of the Delaware death penalty.70 Since nine of
those death sentences were imposed under the initial mandatory scheme,
and were therefore automatically invalidated,71 we will focus on the fortynine defendants sentenced to death using one of the three guided
discretion statutes. Of those forty-nine, only nineteen, or 39%, were white.
Twenty-six, or 53%, were black, and four, or 8%, were Hispanic or Native
American. In contrast, 69% of the Delaware population is white, 21% is
black, and (as is proportionate) 8% are Hispanic.72 The starkness of the
black–white disparity is increasing rather than decreasing over time; all of
the last eight death sentences in Delaware were imposed upon AfricanAmerican defendants. The last white defendant to be sentenced to death in
Delaware was Linda Charbonneau in 2004.73
Thirty-three of the forty-nine cases, or 67%, involve a white victim.74
Moreover, half of the fourteen black-victim cases involved more than one
victim, while only 15% of the thirty-three white-victim cases involved more
than one victim, suggesting that the black-victim cases that do result in death
sentences are more aggravated than are the white victim death cases.75
B. THE RACIAL COMPOSITION OF DELAWARE’S DEATH ROW
There are currently fifteen men on Delaware’s death row.76 Four (27%)
are white, eight (53%) are African-American, and three (20%) are

69. Only one woman, Linda Charbonneau, has been sentenced to death in the modern
era. Her convictions and sentence were reversed on direct appeal, Charbonneau v. State, 904
A.2d 295 (Del. 2006), and she was subsequently resentenced to twenty years. State v.
Charbonneau, Def. ID # 0207003810, 2010 WL 3516430, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2010).
70. For a complete list of persons sentenced to death in Delaware since 1972, see infra
Appendix A.
71. State v. Spence, 367 A.2d 983, 988 (Del. 1976).
72. State and County Quickfacts, supra note 67.
73. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
74. See infra Appendix A.
75. See infra Appendix A.
76. See infra Appendix B; see also http://doc.delaware.gov/information/deathrow.shtml
(last updated Apr. 23, 2012).
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Hispanic.77 The combined minority population thus is 73%. The overall
pattern (and racial disparity) is more stark than that observed nationally,
where, of more than three thousand death sentenced inmates, 44% are
white, 41% are black, 12% are Hispanic, and 2% are reported as other
races.78
Of the current death row inmates, 60% (nine) were convicted of
murdering whites and 40% (six) were convicted of murdering African
Americans.79 Three of the six black-victim cases involved multiple victims,
but all of the current death row inmates sentenced to death in white-victim
cases involved a single-victim homicide.80
C. RACE AND EXECUTIONS
There have been sixteen modern-era executions in Delaware, the most
recent of which was in April of 2012. Of the sixteen death row inmates who
were executed, eight (50%) were white, seven (44%) were African
American, and one (6%) was Native American. Eleven (69%) of the
executed inmates were sentenced to death for killing one or more white
victims, and five (31%) were executed for the murder of one or more black
victims.81
D. RACE AND DEATH-SENTENCING RATES
The death sentence rate—the proportion of all murders that result in a
death sentence—measures “death-proneness” in a jurisdiction. In the next
section, we consider changes over time in the death sentence rate in
Delaware. But death sentence rates can also be used as a measure of racial
disparity. Comparisons between the population and death sentences, such as
those reported above, can be striking—as they are in Delaware—but,
standing alone, must be interpreted cautiously. Racial discrimination might
explain such disparities, but so might differences in underlying offense
rates. Examination of death sentence rates for various race-of-defendant and
race-of-victim combinations, if it reveals large disparities, is less likely to stem
from differences in criminal behavior.
The results of examining Delaware’s death sentencing rate by race of
defendant and victim are dramatic. Figure 1 shows the death sentence rate
for Delaware as a function of the race of defendant and victim.

77. For a complete list, including the race of the defendant and victim of each individual
currently on death row in Delaware, see infra Appendix B.
78. Death Row Population Size and Characteristics, DEATH PENALTY FOCUS, www.deathpenalty.
org/article.php?id=86 (last visited May 8, 2012).
79. See infra Appendix B.
80. See infra Appendix B.
81. For a list of the individuals executed in Delaware, see infra Appendix D. Four of the
eleven white-victim cases involved multiple killings, and three of the five black-victim cases
involved multiple killings.
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FIGURE 1
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DELAWARE’S DEATH SENTENCING RATE PER 1000 HOMICIDES
BY RACE OF DEFENDANT AND RACE OF VICTIM, 1977–2011
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Note: Data for Delaware cover those sentenced to death from 1977 to 2011 and homicides
from 1976 through 2008.

From almost any perspective, it is hard to imagine what would cause
such stark disparities. Black defendants who kill white victims are more than
six times as likely to receive the death penalty as are black defendants who
kill black victims (186.7 per thousand as compared to 28.5 per thousand).
Moreover, black defendants who kill white victims are more than three times
as likely to be sentenced to death as are white defendants who kill white
victims (186.7 per thousand as compared to 52.0 per thousand).
Interestingly, white defendants who kill white victims are about as likely to
receive a death sentence as white defendants who kill black victims (52.0 per
thousand as compared to 48.8 per thousand). The rate that stands out,
however, is the rate for black defendants who kill white victims.
Of course, it is theoretically possible that although these comparisons
control for differences in murder rates, they fail to capture differences in
kinds of murders. Is it plausible that African Americans systematically
commit—and whites systematically are victims of—worse murders? This
seems highly unlikely, but in the final stage of our study of Delaware, we
hope to conclusively resolve this question in true Baldus fashion, by
examining aggravation and mitigation in capital cases, as well as in deatheligible murders. In the meantime, a comparison with death sentencing
rates in other jurisdictions is instructive. Table 1 includes the Delaware data
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from Figure 1 and adds data from seven other states for the time period
between 1977 and 2000.82
TABLE 1
HOW DOES DELAWARE COMPARE TO OTHER STATES DEATH SENTENCING RATES?
Rate of Death Sentences per 1000 Homicides, by Race of Defendant and Victim
Black
Defendant/
Black Victim

Black
Defendant/
White Victim

White
Defendant/
White Victim

White
Defendant/
Black Victim

Delaware

28.5

186.7

52.0

48.8

Georgia

4.5

99.2

41.7

21.4

Indiana

5.6

42.3

21.6

0

Maryland

2.4

52.2

14

7.3

Nevada

24.9

101.1

37

12.5

Pennsylvania

17.7

48.6

22.2

11.9

South
Carolina

2.9

67.8

27.1

50.3

Virginia

3.6

64.5

18.3

23

State

Note:

Data for Delaware cover those sentenced to death from 1977 to 2011
homicides from 1976 through 2008. Periods of included death sentences
homicides for the other states are reported in Blume et al., supra note 5, at
tbl.7, and generally cover death sentences from 1977 through 2001
homicides from 1976 through 1998.

and
and
195
and

Even when compared to Southern states, the Delaware death sentencing
rate for black defendants with white victims is extremely high; it is 75%
higher than the closest contenders, Georgia and Nevada, more than twice as
high as that of South Carolina and Virginia, and more than three times as
high as that of its near neighbors, Maryland and Pennsylvania. One problem
in comparing these states to Delaware is that the figures cover somewhat
different time periods. However, because, as we show below, the death
penalty has declined nationwide over time, the table’s comparison is likely to
understate the disparities between Delaware and other states. Thus, the racial
disparities in the Delaware death sentencing rates are remarkable.
V. DEATH SENTENCING RATES AND JUDGE–JURY DIFFERENCES
One benefit of describing the national pattern of death sentence rates
over time is that the national trend can then provide a background rate, a

82.
97.

The data for the seven other states can be found in Blume et al., supra note 5, at 195–
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kind of quasi-control group, against which to evaluate change over time in
particular states, such as Delaware. Our strategy is first to describe the
national pattern of changes over the time period, and then to identify the
Delaware-specific factors that we want to investigate, and are able to explore
with these data.
A. NATIONAL DEATH SENTENCE RATES
Figure 2 shows the pattern of death sentence rates and the number of
death sentences over time. The numbers representing the data points are
the number of death sentences in a year. The figure shows a steady increase
in death sentence rates in the first decade of the modern capital
punishment era, a decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a near-steady
rate from the early 1990s to about 2000, and a sharp drop beginning at
about the turn of the century. The death sentence rate in the most recent
years is less than half of its peak from 1986 through 1988. The number of
death sentences was fairly steady, about 200 to 300, for well over a decade,
from the early 1980s through about 2000. A sharp drop in the number
began in 2001 and continued through 2006–07, and in the most recent data
we use, is only about 100 per year.
FIGURE 2
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Explaining this national pattern is methodologically challenging due to
interstate variation in death penalty statutes, variation in law enforcement
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processes, and likely changes over time in the factors that influence death
sentence rates. One wants to account for both factors that change over time,
such as the time from arrest to sentence discussed below, as well as for any
underlying global change associated with time. Capturing both a global time
trend as well as the influence of time-varying factors can be difficult.
One important development is the emerging recognition that innocent
people are convicted of crimes. Indeed, as this article goes to press, the
Death Penalty Information Center lists 140 death row inmates as having
been exonerated.83 News coverage of death row exonerations is substantial,84
with a peak in 2000 when Illinois Governor George Ryan announced a
moratorium on executions in Illinois unless he could be convinced that no
innocent person would be executed.85 Increased concern over sentencing an
innocent individual to death might well affect the frequency of death
sentences.
Another likely factor in the rate decline is the increased cost of
processing capital cases. One proxy for that cost is the time between arrest
and imposition of a death sentence. The available BJS data allow assessing
the elapsed time between arrest and death sentence of the period studied,
subject to the limitation of substantial missing arrest-year data in the early
years. Figure 3 shows a notable change over time in the period between
arrest and sentencing. The figure’s solid line shows the mean time between
arrest and death sentence for all states combined. The mean time grew from
about eleven months in 1980 to about thirty-eight months in 2007. So the
pool of murders leading to death sentences in the early years of this study is
closer in time to the year of the death sentence than is the pool of murders
for more recent years. The missing arrest data, noted above, do not lead to a
materially different trend in the earlier years. But the last few decades
indicate that defining the pool of murders using a uniform one-year lag may
oversimplify the temporal relation between murders and death sentences.
The other lines in Figure 3 show the time trend by state for the three states
with the largest death rows, California, Florida, and Texas. The increasing
trend over time is not solely a function of these states, and the trend in these
states is consistent with the overall trend.

83. See Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty (last updated Feb. 7, 2012).
84. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, SUZANNA L. DE BOEF & AMBER E. BOYDSTUN, THE DECLINE OF
THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE 52 (2008).
85. Id. at 67.
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FIGURE 3
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For death sentences from 1977 through 1994, the median arrest year
was about one year earlier. For death sentences imposed from 1995 through
2005, the median year of arrest was about two years earlier. For death
sentences imposed in 2006 and 2007, the median arrest year was about 2.5
years earlier.
There are several other reasons why the number of death sentences may
be declining. One is that life without parole is now an option in every death
penalty jurisdiction.86 The availability of life without parole makes both
prosecutors less likely to seek death and juries less likely to impose the death
penalty.87 The decline in death sentences is also almost certainly
attributable, at least in part, to declining public support for capital
punishment. Over the last decade, the number of Americans who are in
favor of the death penalty has dropped to its lowest level in fifty years.88
According to recent polling data, 61% of the American people support the
86. John H. Blume, “The Times They Are A-Changin’” (or are they?), CORNELL L. F., Spring
2010, at 18, 20.
87. Id. Prosecutors are less likely to seek death because issues of future dangerousness are
greatly reduced if it is virtually certain the person will never be released back into society.
Additionally, it is easier for prosecutors to persuade a surviving victim’s family members to
agree to a negotiated settlement of the case and avoid a capital trial when they can be assured
that the perpetrator will die in prison.
88. Id. at 18.
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death penalty.89 However, when offered alternatives to capital punishment,
including life without parole, public support drops to 49%.90 This changing
view of capital punishment would logically tend to influence both
prosecutorial and jury behavior since, in most jurisdictions, the jurors have
to unanimously agree that the death penalty is the appropriate
punishment.91 Additional factors that might be associated with change in
death sentence rates are Supreme Court rulings regarding the
constitutionality of the execution of juveniles and those suffering from
mental retardation, but neither of these affected a large number of death
sentences.92
B. DELAWARE-SPECIFIC STATUTORY CHANGES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON DEATH
SENTENCE RATES
Many factors are likely at work at the state and local level which cannot
be fully accounted for due to difficulty in quantitatively representing them as
well as limitations on knowledge of the factors. In any particular state,
however, detailed institutional knowledge can supply additional factors for
comparison to the national rate. In this analysis, we consider Delaware’s
changes in capital-sentencing laws over the time period, in particular, the
statutory changes in judge versus jury capital sentencing. We now seek to
evaluate the impact of these statutory shifts on the death sentence rate by
using the national pattern we have identified. Whatever the complex factors
shaping the national pattern, Figure 2 shows the resulting rises and falls in
death sentencing rates. One can think of this time pattern as representing
all influences on death sentence rates, even if we cannot identify or observe
the influences individually. If we can reasonably assume that Delaware
experienced roughly the same influences shaping the national pattern, by
accounting for the Figure 2 pattern in models, we can then explore how
Delaware-specific variations may have influenced changes in Delaware death
sentence rates.
Figure 4 shows death penalty sentencing rates over time, both nationally
and in specific states, including Delaware. The sentencing rate calculates the
number of death sentences over the number of homicides in the time
period and in the state. Figure 4 displays the death sentence rate over the

89. Death Penalty, GALLUP, www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited
May 8, 2012).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (2011).
92. This is true because prior to the Court's decisions establishing categorical bans, a
majority of death penalty states had abolished the practice of sentencing juveniles or persons
with mental retardation to death. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–66 (2005); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002). Even in those jurisdictions which still allowed the
practice, death sentences were rarely imposed on individuals in those two categories. Roper, 543
U.S. at 564–65; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
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years of the modern death penalty era through 2007. The line represented
by the shortest dashes represents the death sentence rate for all states other
than Delaware. The rate has remained between 1% of murders and about
3% of murders throughout the modern era.
In addition to excluding Delaware, this line differs from the pattern
shown in Figure 2 in a few ways. The Figure 4 line is in a figure that includes
a much broader range of death sentence rates than the range in Figure 2.
The 1% to 3% range adequate for the national pattern is inadequate to
describe Delaware’s annual death sentence rates. In some years, the
Delaware death sentence rate exceeded 20%, though some of this volatility
likely stems from Delaware being a small state with a correspondingly small
number of murders. The need to expand the scale of the y-axis makes the
national trend line in Figure 4 appear to be much smoother than the
national pattern as represented in Figure 2.
Figure 4 includes the death sentence rate over time for two states other
than Delaware. We chose Pennsylvania and Maryland because both border
Delaware and have capital punishment. Thus, we consider the pattern in
those states to evaluate the possibility that some regional factor explains
Delaware’s deviation from the national pattern. Figure 4 includes vertical
lines for 1991 and 2002 that represent the two major statutory changes in
Delaware’s death penalty law described above.
FIGURE 4
ALL STATES, DELAWARE, PENNSYLVANIA, AND MARYLAND
DEATH SENTENCE RATES, BY YEAR
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The Delaware-specific story suggested by Figure 4 is that, until the shift
to greater judge involvement in sentencing in 1991, Delaware’s death
sentence rates did not materially differ from those of other states. Delaware’s
rate was higher from 1977 to 1985, then dipped below the national rate
until 1990, and slightly exceeded it in 1991. Corresponding to the adoption
of increased judicial involvement in capital sentencing, Delaware’s rate both
rose and became volatile through 2002. The volatility was largely
unidirectional in the sense that Delaware’s rate rarely dipped below the
national death sentence rate and, on average, was much higher. Delaware’s
rate calmed down in 2002 but still generally remained above the national
rate. Figure 4’s Pennsylvania and Maryland lines support the impression
created by comparing the national line with Delaware’s line; Delaware’s rate
jumped compared to those two states in 1991 as well, and, on average, has
remained well above both states’ rates ever since.
C. REGRESSION MODELS OF DELAWARE SENTENCING RATES
Although Figure 4 is compelling and gives us a sense that the statutory
changes in decision maker roles were associated with changes in death
sentencing rates, one limitation of Figure 4 is that it cannot establish the
statistical significance of Delaware’s death sentence rate. To explore whether
the pattern suggested by Figure 4 is statistically significant, we employ
regression models. In those models, we wish to account for the national
“background” time pattern of death sentence rates reflected in Figure 2.
The background rate can be thought of as capturing all non-Delawarespecific factors, whatever they are, that produce Figure 2’s time pattern.
A simple time term cannot adequately represent time and the
background national trend because it is obviously nonlinear. Several
techniques exist to capture and control for nonlinear trends.93 We use
fractional polynomial models, which are often employed to model a
nonlinear pattern when primary interest is in the covariates, but time must
be controlled for.94

93. Alternatives to the approach we employ (fractional polynomial models) include using
time (year) polynomial terms with multiple powers. It appears from Figure 2 that a polynomial
of degree five would be needed to capture the various inflection points. Other approaches
include splines (which fit different lines to the data at obvious breakpoints) and partial linear
models.
94. E.g., David A.M. Peterson, Lawrence J. Grossback, James A. Stimson & Amy Gangl,
Congressional Response to Mandate Elections, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 411 (2003); Patrick Royston,
Gareth Ambler & Willi Sauerbrei, The Use of Fractional Polynomials To Model Continuous Risk
Variables in Epidemiology, 28 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 964 (1999).
On the issue of lags, the change over the time period of this study in the time between
arrest and death sentence complicates estimating death sentence rates. Computing death
sentence rates by associating death sentences with murders in a single prior year (the year
preceding sentence, for example) is not fully satisfactory. Figure 3 shows a notable change over
time in the period between arrest and sentencing. The pool of murders leading to death
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In addition to accounting for time, we include in our regression models
variables that seek to assess any of Delaware’s distinctive effects. Since
Delaware allowed judges to sentence in 1991, we want to assess Delaware’s
death sentence rate while accounting for any effect that may be distinctive to
the sentencing role it gives to judges, but is not unique to Delaware. That is,
we want to assess whether Delaware’s death sentence rates are a generic
consequence of its use of judges or more specific to Delaware. To do this, we
characterized the death sentencing scheme of all states with an eye towards
the role of the judge in sentencing.95
A third variable we have included in our model is exonerations.96 To
pick up state-level exoneration effects, we include a variable that includes

sentences in the early years of this study is closer in time to the year of death sentence than is
the pool of murders for more recent years. The last few decades show that defining the pool of
murders using a uniform one-year lag may oversimplify the temporal relation between murders
and death sentences. To reflect the changing elapsed time between arrest and sentence, we use
a pool of murders that reflects this shifting pattern. We inspected the pattern of arrest years for
each death sentence year and employ the following algorithm for constructing a measure of the
pool of murders from which death sentences were drawn. For each year of death sentences we
calculate a death sentence rate using murder arrests from previous years or the current death
sentence year that accounts for at least 75% of the year’s death sentences with known arrest
years. For death sentences imposed from 1977 through 1982, we use the average number of
murders in the death sentence year and the prior year as the denominator (the pool of
murders) in calculating death sentence rates. For death sentences imposed from 1983 through
1987, we use the average annual number of murders in the present year plus the two prior
years. For death sentences from 1988 through 1994, we use the average number of murders in
the three prior years. For 1995 through 2004, we use the average number of murders in the
four prior years. For death sentences in 2005, 2006, and 2007, we use the average annual
number of murders in the prior five years.
95. Of the judicial-sentencing states most directly affected by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002), Arizona and Colorado implemented jury sentencing after Ring. For example, Arizona
requires full jury participation in capital sentencing. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01(D)
(2012). Idaho also moved to full jury participation. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (2011).
Montana enacted anticipatory legislation in 2001 making it a hybrid state, which prohibits the
judge from increasing a sentence in criminal cases tried before a jury unless the jury
unanimously finds that “the enhancing act, omission, or fact occurred beyond a reasonable
doubt.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-1-401 (2011).
Of the hybrid states, Florida, the largest capital punishment state seemingly affected by
Ring, has done nothing. See generally Slobogin, supra note 7. Florida continues to employ its preRing system despite repeated constitutional challenges, all of which have been rejected by the
Florida Supreme Court. E.g., Hodges v. State, 55 So.3d 515, 540–41 (Fla. 2010) (holding Ring
inapplicable). So Florida continues to be a hybrid state in the Supreme Court’s taxonomy. The
same appears true for Alabama. E.g., Doster v. State, 72 So.3d 50, 105 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
Indiana amended its statute in 2002 so that the jury now has to find the presence of aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and the judge must follow the jury's unanimous
recommendation as to death, life, or term of years. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (2011). As of
2002, therefore, Indiana should be characterized as a jury-sentencing state. Delaware changed
its statute in 2002 as described above and remains a hybrid state. See supra notes 36–40 and
accompanying text.
96. We include this variable despite the fact that there have been no official exonerations
in Delaware to date because, as noted above, exonerations have played a major role in
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the number of death sentence exonerations in each state in each year. An
exoneration in a particular year might not be expected to have its maximum
effect on death sentences in that year, since the death sentencing process
now takes multiple years and is shaped by prosecutorial decisions as well as
by judge and jury adjudication. Preliminary analysis suggests the strongest
association between exonerations four years before the year of sentencing.
Other scholars have also justified a four-year lag.97 We therefore use a fouryear lag of exonerations in our regression models.
Finally, we wish to account for changes in Delaware law. To account for
changes in the decision-maker, we include three dummy variables in the
regression models: The first variable accounts for Delaware law up to 1991
and is equal to one for Delaware for years prior to 1991; the second variable
accounts for Delaware’s initial judge-sentencing regime and equals one for
the period 1991 through 2002; and the third variable accounts for the 2002
statutory change and equals one for the period after 2002.
A further complication is introduced by the fact that each state in our
data is observed multiple times (one death sentence rate for each state for
each year), so we also need to account for the non-independence of
multiple observations of the same state. The dependent variable, the
number of death sentences in a state in a year, is binomial in that a death
sentence is imposed or not imposed in each murder case. We therefore
need to use a model that accounts for the number of events (murders) from
which death sentences might be drawn. To implement all these features, we
use appropriate generalized estimating equations with the state as an
identifier variable. A fractional polynomial of degree three was used to
model background time effects.
Table 2 reports the results. Model (1) includes the Delaware dummy
variables, a variable representing lagged exonerations, and the nonlinear
time term (not reported). Model (2) adds a variable representing states with
hybrid sentencing systems, and model (3) adds a variable for states with
judge-sentencing systems.
Since the Delaware dummy variables span the time period of the data,
the coefficients on those variables are in comparison to states other than
Delaware. Thus, the coefficient on the “Delaware to 1991” variable indicates,
in all three models, that Delaware’s death sentence rate was not significantly
different from that of other states up to 1991. Some caution is in order
because the number of cases in Delaware is relatively small overall, and a
failure to find statistical significance could be due to the low numbers. Even
so, the coefficient on the “Delaware 1991 to 2002” variable is highly

reshaping perceptions of the death penalty and likely help shape the national time pattern in
Figure 2.
97. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 84, at 207 (“[I]t will take about four years for effects
[on death sentences] to reach their full impact.”).
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statistically significant in all models. This supports the theory that the 1992
Delaware change to judge sentencing led to Delaware’s death sentence rate
increasing relative to that of other states. The coefficient on the “Delaware
post-2002” variable is not statistically significant, suggesting that the law
change in 2002 (or some coincident event) brought Delaware’s death
sentence rate back down relative to that of other states. Note that the
positive sign on this coefficient corresponds to the elevated location of
Delaware’s line in Figure 3, which remained above that of other states after
2002.
Also of interest are the within-Delaware effects. The highly significant
“Delaware 1991 to 2002” coefficient and the consistent negative sign on the
“Delaware to 1991” coefficient suggest a statistically significant difference
within Delaware for these two time periods. This is consistent with Figure 4’s
sharp visual difference between these two time periods. Other withinDelaware effects can be assessed using the probabilities reported in Table 2’s
last two rows. The last row tests the hypothesis that the coefficient for
Delaware to 1991 equals the coefficient for Delaware after 2002. That
difference is significant or near significant in all three models. The reduced
effect in models (2) and (3) likely is due to the inclusion in those models of
the hybrid dummy variable, which is coded one for Delaware as of 1991.
The hybrid dummy likely is picking up some of the within-Delaware effect
since Delaware was not a hybrid state until 1991. The penultimate row tests
the hypothesis that the coefficient for “Delaware 1991 to 2002” differs from
that for Delaware after 2002. The difference is statistically significant in
model (3) but not in the other two models. Since model (3) only adds a
variable (insignificant) for judge-sentencing states, it is not clear what the
interpretation of that difference should be.
It is interesting to observe that the exonerations variable is statistically
significant in all three models. The (lagged) effect of exonerations in a state
is associated with a reduction in death penalty sentences.
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TABLE 2

BINOMIAL REGRESSION MODELS OF THE NUMBER OF INMATES ON DEATH ROW
(1)
Variables
Delaware to 1991

Delaware 1991 to 2002

Delaware post-2002

(2)

(3)

Dependent variable = number of inmates on death row
-0.605

-0.345

-0.338

(1.151)

(1.009)

(1.005)

1.468***

1.238***

1.239***

(0.495)

(0.469)

(0.468)

0.874

0.671

0.672

(0.743)

(0.684)

(0.683)

0.377***

0.379***

(0.093)

(0.093)

Hybrid judge–jury
sentencing state

Judge-sentencing state

0.023
(0.129)

Exonerations in state, by
year, lagged

-0.053**

-0.060**

-0.059**

(0.024)

(0.023)

(0.023)

Nonlinear time trend
variables
Observations
Number of states
Prob. Delaware 1991 to
2002 = Delaware post2002
Prob. Delaware to 1991 =
Delaware post-2002

Not shown
1021

1021

1021

36

36

36

0.179

0.173

0.0170**

0.0270**

0.0939*

0.0945*

Note: The regression models cover death sentences from 1978 to 2007 and the observations for
each year are at the state level. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p <.1; ** p<.05; ***p <.01
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VI. APPEALS AND ERROR RATES
The Delaware Supreme Court has decided fifty-five cases on direct
appeal,98 reversing the conviction in four cases and the sentence in eleven
more, and the United States Supreme Court ordered resentencing in an
additional case after the judgment was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme
Court. The combined error rate on direct appeal was thus 29%. Twelve of
those sixteen individuals were subsequently resentenced to life in prison or a
prison sentence, and two were subsequently resentenced to death and
ultimately executed. One is currently on death row, and the other was
retried and his sentencing is pending.99
Four death sentenced inmates obtained new trials, either as to guilt or
penalty, in state post-conviction proceedings, and two were successful in
federal post-conviction proceedings. This yields an overall error rate of
40%.100 Of the four inmates who prevailed in state post-conviction, three of
the four were resentenced to death; of the two inmates who prevailed in
federal habeas corpus, both were resentenced to life imprisonment.101
While clemency is not, technically speaking, part of the appellate
process, it is relevant to the question of error rates. There has been only one
grant of clemency. Robert Gattis was recently granted executive clemency in
a high-profile decision heralded in a New York Times editorial.102 Delaware

98. The number of appeals is greater than the number of persons sentenced to death
under the guided discretion statute because some persons had their convictions or sentence
reversed and then were resentenced to death and appealed again. For a list of all the cases
decided on direct appeal, see infra Appendix E.
99. See infra Appendix E.
100. According to Professors James Liebman, Andrew Gelman, and their colleagues’
Broken System Studies, across the United States at least one error is found in 68% of capital
cases. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973–1995
(2000) [hereinafter BROKEN SYSTEM I]; JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., WHY THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR
IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2002) [hereinafter BROKEN SYSTEM II];
Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Pattern of Reversals of Death Sentences in the
United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 217 (2004).
101. For a chart establishing the types of errors found in Delaware cases, see infra
Appendix F. We would also note that two things of significance have not happened in Delaware.
The Delaware Supreme Court has not found that any death sentence imposed by a jury or
judge was disproportionate to the offense or to the sentence imposed in a similar case, and
there have been no official exonerations in the state to date. We also examined whether the
error rates were different in the three capital sentencing schemes that Delaware has used.
During the jury sentencing era, the overall error rate (including direct appeal and postconviction) was 60%. In the judge sentencing era, the overall error rate is 33% to date with
some cases still pending. Under the current scheme, where the judge determines death
eligibility and the judge sentences, the overall error rate to date is also 33%, but all cases
affirmed on direct appeal are still pending elsewhere in the capital appeals process. For a list of
inmates sentenced to death in Delaware by capital sentencing scheme, see infra Appendix C.
102. Gattis was granted clemency on January 17, 2012. Sean O’Sullivan, Markell Spares Gattis
the Death Penalty, NEWS J. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.bishop-accountability.org/news2012/
01_02/2012_01_17_OSullivan_MarkellSpares.htm; Editorial, A Death Penalty Commutation, N.Y.
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Governor Jack Markell’s decision followed an unusual four-to-one
recommendation in favor of clemency by the state’s Board of Pardons.103
Governor Markell based his decision on the fact that the jury that sentenced
Gattis to death did not hear a full presentation of the mitigating evidence
regarding his family background.104 As a result, Gattis’s death sentence was
commuted to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,
conditional upon his willingness to forego any future challenges to his
conviction and life sentence.
The implications of high error rates are open to dispute. Some might
argue that a high error rate indicates the appellate review system is working,
while others might say that high error rates reflect the fallibility of the
system, and that a system charged with determining who should live and who
should die should not make substantial numbers of mistakes. Another way to
look at this question is to consider whether the results after retrial validate
the original decision to impose death. Here the answer is clearer: In
Delaware, 68% of the individuals whose death sentences were reversed have
been resentenced to life imprisonment.105 Indeed, more than a third of all
individuals sentenced to death in Delaware during the period under study
eventually were resentenced to life imprisonment.106

TIMES (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/opinion/a-death-penaltycommutation.html.
103. Jack Markell, Govenor, State of Del., Statement of Govenor Jack Markell Regarding
the Commutation of Sentence of Robert Gattis (Jan. 17, 2012), available at http://news.
delaware.gov/2012/01/17/statement-of-governor-jack-markell-regarding-the-commutation-ofsentence-of-robert-gattis/. The Board of Pardons cited several reasons for the majority’s
recommendation. The defendant’s significant history of childhood sexual abuse and possible
mental illness had not been fully presented to the judge and jury that decided his punishment.
Board of Pardons, State of Del., Board of Pardons Recommendation to Governor Markell
Regarding Clemency of Robert Gattis (Jan. 15, 2012), available at http://news.delaware.
gov/2012/01/15/board-of-pardons-recommendation-regarding-clemency-of-robert-gattis/.
Furthermore, Board members noted that the jury had not been unanimous in its punishment
recommendation (it had voted in favor of aggravating factors outweighing mitigating factors by
a ten to two split), and they expressed concern “that our death penalty statute permits the
imposition of death on the basis of a non-unanimous verdict.” Id. The Board’s statement also
expressed worry about observed disparities in the sentences meted out for comparable crimes
in Delaware. Id.
104. See Jack Markell, supra note 103. Markell concluded: “After my review, I find myself in
agreement with the four members of the Board of Pardons who concluded the mitigating
evidence here is sufficiently substantial that an act of clemency on my part is warranted. In
doing so, I am committed to the fact that Mr. Gattis will spend his remaining life in prison and
will pose no threat to public safety.” Id.
105. See infra Appendix A.
106. Since most death sentenced inmates in Delaware still have appeals pending, the
number who eventually leave death row exonerated or with lesser sentences will inevitably be
higher.
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CONCLUSION
Our conclusions are limited to three main observations. First,
Delaware’s reversal rate of 40%, while considerable, is also substantially
lower than that of other jurisdictions. This may not be surprising given that
jury verdicts offer more opportunities for reversal, and indeed, reversal rates
during the jury-sentencing period approximate the national average.107
Our second observation is that judge-sentencing results in more death
sentences. This may surprise no one; indeed, the presumption that judges
would be more willing than juries to impose capital punishment appeared to
motivate the statutory change to judge sentencing.108 Whether the
mechanism behind greater judicial harshness is the absence of a need for
unanimity, political pressure, or something else, our model reveals that
judge sentencing produces more death sentences. Moreover, this effect is
more pronounced in Delaware than in other states. Thus, putting aside
whether the Delaware Supreme Court was right as a legal matter that judge
sentencing could be retroactively applied to cases where the crime occurred
during a jury-sentencing regime, the change it labeled “procedural” affected
the likelihood of receiving a death sentence in a statistically significant way.
Finally, we find a dramatic disparity of death-sentencing rates by race,
one substantially more pronounced than in other jurisdictions. This finding
calls for more investigation, and also serves as a fitting conclusion to this
Article’s tribute to David Baldus. As he told us more than a quarter of
century ago, race matters in capital sentencing, and we need to continue to
pursue knowledge about where, when, and how.

107.
108.

See supra notes 100–01.
Fleury-Steiner et al., supra note 28.
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APPENDIX A

DELAWARE DEATH SENTENCES
COMPLETE LIST OF THOSE SENTENCED TO DEATH 1976 THROUGH AUGUST 2012

Name

Def.'s Victim's
Race & Race &
Sex
Sex

County of
Conviction

Original
Sentence
Date

Final Result

Richardson, Roy

W/M

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Eaton, Phillip

W/M

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Shields, Linwood
(Juvenile)

B/M

Foraker, Franklin

W/M

Carpenter, Allen

W/M

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Golson, Robert

B/M

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Hooks, Clarence

B/M

Johnson, Wilbur

B/M

Hobbs, Sterling
(AKA Raymond
Vanderburg)

B/M

Whalen, Frank

W/M

W/F

Kent

4/28/78

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Flamer, William

B/M

B/M
B/F

Kent

2/15/80

Executed

Bailey, Billy

W/M

W/M
W/F

Kent

3/10/80

Executed

Rush, David

W/M

W/M

New Castle

Deputy, Andre

B/M

B/M
B/F

Kent

4/1/80

Riley, James

B/M

W/M

Kent

12/20/82

Deshields, Kenneth

B/M

W/F

Sussex

4/4/86

Sanders, Reginald

B/M

W/M

Kent

Oct-86

Dawson, David

W/M

W/F

Kent

7/24/88

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment
Executed
Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment
Executed

New Castle

Aug-91

Executed

New Castle
Kent

4/16/92
10/30/92

Executed
Executed

Pennell, Steven

W/M

Red Dog, James
Sullivan, Willie

NA/M
B/M

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment
Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment
Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment
Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

W/F
W/F
W/M
W/M

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment
Executed
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Def.'s
Race &
Sex

Victim's
Race &
Sex

County of
Conviction

Original
Sentence
Date

Final Result

Gattis, Robert

B/M

B/F

New Castle

10/29/92

Sentence
Commuted to Life
Imprisonment

Wright, Jermaine

B/M

W/M

New Castle

10/29/92

Pending

Hameen, Abdullah
(AKA Cornelius
Ferguson)

B/M

B/M

New Castle

12/7/92

Executed

Jackson, Robert

W/M

W/F

New Castle

4/28/93

Executed

Shelton, Nelson

W/M

W/M

New Castle

4/30/93

Executed

Name

Shelton, Steven

W/M

W/M

New Castle

1/12/92

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Outten, Jack

W/M

W/M

New Castle

4/30/93

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Lawrie, David

W/M

W/M
W/F
W/F

Kent

7/9/93

Executed

Weeks, Dwayne

B/M

B/M
B/F

New Castle

7/9/93

Executed

Clark, James

W/M

W/M
W/F

New Castle

1/5/95

Executed

Steckel, Brian

W/M

W/F

New Castle

1/8/97

Executed

Stevenson, David

B/M

W/M

New Castle

1/10/97;
2/3/06

Pending

Manley, Michael

B/M

W/M

New Castle

1/10/97;
2/3/06

Pending

Zebroski, Craig

W/M

B/M

New Castle

8/18/97

Pending

Barnett, Jermaine

B/M

W/M

New Castle

2/3/98

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Barrow, Hector

B/M

W/M

New Castle

2/3/98

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Ashley, Robert

W/M

B/M

New Castle

3/19/99

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Capano, Thomas J. W/M

W/F

New Castle

3/16/99

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Flonnory, Freddie

B/M

B/F
B/F

New Castle

2/19/04;
7/22/04

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Garden, Sadiki

B/M

W/F

New Castle

3/25/01

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Taylor, Milton

B/M

B/F

New Castle

7/6/01

Pending

Norcross, Adam

W/M

W/M

Kent

10/3/01

Pending

Swan, Ralph

W/M

W/M

Kent

10/3/01

Pending
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Def.'s
Race &
Sex

Victim's
Race &
Sex

County of
Conviction

Original
Sentence
Date

Final Result

Cabrera, Luis

H/M

B/M
B/M

New Castle

3/14/02

Pending

Reyes, Luis

H/M

B/M
B/M

New Castle

3/14/02

Pending

Williams, Joseph

B/M

B/F

New Castle

8/3/01

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment

Ortiz, Juan J.
Ploof, Gary

H/M
W/M

W/F
W/F

Kent
Kent

9/26/03
8/22/03

Pending
Pending

Charbonneau,
Linda

W/F

W/M
W/M

Sussex

6/4/04

Resentenced to
Imprisonment for
Term of Years

Starling, Chauncy

B/M

B/M
B/M

New Castle

6/10/04

Pending

Sykes, Ambrose
Cooke, James E.,
Jr.

B/M

W/F

Kent

9/20/06

Pending

B/M

W/F

New Castle

6/6/07

Pending

Norman, Allison

B/M

B/M

Sussex

Jun.-07

Johnson, Shannon B/M
Taylor, Emmett, III B/M

B/M
B/F

New Castle
Sussex

9/5/08
1/12/10

Resentenced to Life
Imprisonment
Executed
Pending

Powell, Derrick
Small, Leslie

W/M
W/F

Sussex
Sussex

5/20/11
7/22/11

Pending
Pending

Name

B/M
B/M
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APPENDIX B
DELAWARE’S CURRENT DEATH ROW

Name

Def.'s Race & Victim's Race &
Sex
Sex

County of
Conviction

Original Sentence
Date

Stevenson,
David
Manley, Michael
Zebroski, Craig
Taylor, Milton
Norcross, Adam
Swan, Ralph

B/M

W/M

New Castle

1/10/97; 2/3/06

B/M
W/M
B/M
W/M
W/M

New Castle
New Castle
New Castle
Kent
Kent

1/10/97; 2/3/06
8/18/97
7/6/01
10/3/01
10/3/01

Cabrera, Luis

H/M

New Castle

3/14/02

Reyes, Luis

H/M

New Castle

3/14/02

Ortiz, Juan J.
Ploof, Gary

H/M
W/M

W/M
B/M
B/F
W/M
W/M
B/M
B/M
B/M
B/M
W/F
W/F

Kent
Kent

9/26/03
8/22/03

B/M

2B/M

New Castle

6/10/04

B/M

W/F

Kent

9/20/06

B/M

B/F

Sussex

1/12/10

B/M

W/M

Sussex

5/20/11

B/M

W/F

Sussex

7/22/11

Starling,
Chauncy
Sykes, Ambrose
Taylor, Emmett,
III
Powell, Derrick
Small, Leslie
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APPENDIX C
NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS SENTENCED IN MODERN ERA CATEGORIZED BY
STATUTORY SCHEME
1977 Statute
 Jury Sentences

1991 Amendment
 Judge Sentences; and
 Jury Recommends

1977–Nov. 1991

Nov. 1991–June 2002

2002 Amendment
 Judge Sentences;
 Jury Recommends; and
 Jury Must Unanimously Agree
on One Aggravating Factor
June 2002–Present

Whalen, Frank*
Flamer, William

Red Dog, James
Sullivan, Willie

Ortiz, Juan J.
Ploof, Gary

Bailey, Billy

Gattis, Robert*

Charbonneau, Linda*

Rush, David*

Wright, Jermaine**

Starling, Chauncy

Deputy, Andre

Hameen, Abduallah (AKA
Cornelius Ferguson)

Sykes, Ambrose

Riley, James*

Jackson, Robert

Norman, Allison*

Deshields, Kenneth

Shelton, Nelson

Cooke, James E., Jr.**

Sanders, Reginald*

Shelton, Steven*

Johnson, Shannon

Dawson, David

Outten, Jack*

Taylor, Emmett, III

Pennell, Steven***

Lawrie, David

Powell, Derrick

Weeks, Dwayne
Clark, James
Steckel, Brian
Stevenson, David

Small, Leslie

Manley, Michael
Zebroski, Craig
Barnett, Jermaine*
Barrow, Hector*
Flonnory, Freddie*
Ashley, Robert*
Capano, Thomas J.*
Garden, Sadiki*
Taylor, Milton
Norcross, Adam
Swan, Ralph
Cabrera, Luis
Reyes, Luis
Williams, Joseph*
*
**
***

Indicates the individual was resentenced or the sentences was commuted to life
in prison or term of years
Indicates pending new trial or new sentencing
While Pennell was sentenced (by a judge) before the 1991 amendment took
effect, his appeals came after the amendment
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APPENDIX D
DELAWARE EXECUTIONS
1976 THROUGH AUGUST 2012
Def.'s Victim's
County of Sentence
Race Race &
Conviction
Date
& Sex
Sex
Flamer,
B/M
B/M
Kent
2/15/80
William
B/F
W/M
Bailey, Billy W/M
Kent
3/10/80
W/F
Deputy,
B/M
B/M
Kent
4/1/80
Andre
B/F
Deshields,
B/M
W/F
Kent
4/4/86
Kenneth
Dawson,
W/M
W/F
Kent
7/24/88
David
Pennell,
W/F
W/M
New Castle Oct-91
Steven
W/F
Red Dog,
NA/M W/M New Castle 4/16/92
James
Sullivan,
B/M
W/M
Kent
10/30/92
Willie
Hameen,
Abdullah
(AKA
B/M
B/M New Castle 12/7/92
Cornelius
Ferguson)
Shelton,
W/M W/M New Castle 4/30/93
Nelson
Name

Execution
Date

Method of
Execution

Executed
1/30/1996
Executed
1/25/1996

Lethal
Injection

Executed
6/23/1994
Executed
8/31/1993

Lethal
Injection
Lethal
Injection

Executed
4/26/2001

Lethal
Injection

Executed
3/14/1992
Executed
3/3/1993
Executed
9/24/1999

Lethal
Volunteer
Injection
Lethal
Volunteer
Injection
Lethal
Injection

Executed
5/25/2001

Lethal
Injection

Executed
3/17/1995

Lethal
Volunteer
Injection
Lethal
Injection

Other

Hanging

W/M

W/M
W/F
W/F
W/F

Kent

7/9/93

Executed
4/23/1999

Weeks,
Dwayne

B/M

B/M
B/F

New Castle

7/9/93

Executed
Lethal
11/17/2000 Injection

Clark,
James

W/M

W/M
W/F

New Castle

1/5/95

Executed
4/19/1996

Lethal
Volunteer
Injection

Steckel,
Brian

W/M

W/F

New Castle

1/8/97

Lethal
Injection

Jackson,
Robert

W/M

W/F

New Castle 4/28/93

Johnson,
Shannon

B/M

B/M

New Castle

Executed
11/4/2005
Executed
7/29/2011
Executed
4/20/2012

Lawrie,
David

9/5/08

Lethal
Injection
Lethal
Volunteer
Injection
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APPENDIX E
DELAWARE DIRECT APPEAL CASES
1982–2011
RESULT

CURRENT
STATUS

Reversed-S

Life in Prison

Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 865 (1983).

Affirmed

Executed

Bailey v. State, 490 A.2d 158 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 867 (1983); Bailey v. State, 503 A.2d 1210 (Del.
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 873 (1985).

Affirmed

Executed

CASE NAME
Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1980), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 910 (1982).

Rush v. State, 491 A.2d 439 (Del. 1985).

Reversed-S

Life in Prison

Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 478
U.S. 1022 (1986).

Affirmed

Life in Prison

Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 940 (1987).

Affirmed

Executed

DeShields v. State, 534 A.2d 630 (Del. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1017 (1988).

Affirmed

Executed

Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078 (Del. 1990), rev'd and
remanded, 503 U.S. 159 (1992), 608 A.2d 1201 (1992).

Reversed-S

Executed

Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117 (Del. 1990).

Reversed-S

Life in Prison

Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1992).

Affirmed

Executed

Red Dog v. State, 616 A.2d 298 (Del. 1992).

Affirmed

Executed

Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931 (Del. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 833 (1994).

Affirmed

Executed

Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57 (Del. 1994).

Affirmed

Executed

Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808 (Del. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 843 (1994).

Affirmed

Granted
Clemency
01/17/2012

Wright v. State, 633 A.2d 329 (Del. 1993).

Affirmed

Pending

Ferguson v. State, 642 A.2d 772 (Del. 1994), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1014 (1996).

Affirmed

Executed

Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336 (Del. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1048 (1994).

Affirmed

Executed

Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360 (Del. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1136 (1995).

Reversed-S

Executed

Outten v. State, 650 A.2d 1291 (Del. 1994), cert. denied,
515 U.S. 1145 (1995) (for Steven Shelton and Outten).

Affirmed

Life in Prison

Shelton v. State, 650 A.2d 1291 (Del. 1994).

Affirmed

Executed

Weeks v. State, 653 A.2d 266 (Del. 1995).

Affirmed

Executed
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CASE NAME

Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552 (Del. 1985).

RESULT

CURRENT
STATUS

Reversed-S

Life in Prison

Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353 (Del. 1996), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1249 (1996).

Affirmed

On Row

Clark v. State, 672 A.2d 1004 (Del. 1996).

Affirmed

Executed

Jackson v. State, 684 A.2d 745 (Del. 1996), cert. denied, 520
Affirmed
U.S. 1171 (1997).

Executed

Manley v. State, 709 A.2d 643 (Del. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 893 (1998).

Affirmed

On Row

Stevenson v. State, 709 A.2d 619 (Del. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 967 (1998).

Affirmed

On Row

Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).

Affirmed

Executed

Zebroski v. State, 715 A.2d 75 (Del. 1998).

Affirmed

On Row

Reversed-S

Life in Prison

Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556 (Del. 2001), cert. denied,
536 U.S. 958 (2002).

Affirmed

Life in Prison
(deceased)

Flonnery v. State, 778 A.2d 1044 (Del. 2001).

ReversedNT

Life in Prison

Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d 1019 (Del. 2002).

ReversedNT

Life in Prison

Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2002).

Reversed-S

Life in Prison

Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327 (Del. 2003).

Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del. 2000) (for Barnett
and Barrow).

Reversed-S

Life in Prison

Norcross v. State, 816 A.2d 757 (Del. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 833 (2003).

Affirmed

On Row

Reyes v. State, 819 A.2d 305 (Del. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 862 (2003) (for Reyes and Cabrera).

Affirmed

On Row

Swan v. State, 820 A.2d 342 (Del. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 896 (2003).

Affirmed

On Row

Taylor v. State, 822 A.2d 1052 (Del. 2003), cert. denied, 540
Affirmed
U.S. 931 (2003).

On Row

Garden v. State, 844 A.2d 311 (Del. 2004).

Reversed-S

Life in Prison

Ploof v. State, 856 A.2d 539 (Del. 2004).

Affirmed

On Row

Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285 (Del. 2005), cert. denied, 546
U.S. 832 (2005).

Affirmed

On Row

Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747 (Del. 2005), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 1216 (2006).

Reversed-S

On Row

Charbonneau v. State, 904 A.2d 295 (Del. 2006).

ReversedNT

Prison Term

Starling v. State, 903 A.2d 758 (Del. 2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1324 (2007).

Affirmed

On Row
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RESULT

CURRENT
STATUS

Manley v. State, 918 A.2d 321 (Del. 2007), cert. denied,
550 U.S. 971 (2007) (2 defendants – Manley and
Stevenson).

Affirmed

On Row

Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261 (Del. 2008), cert. denied, 555
U.S. 969 (2008).

Affirmed

On Row

Norman v. State, 976 A.2d 843 (Del. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S.Ct. 561 (2009).

Reversed-S

Life in Prison

Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009), cert. denied, 130
S.Ct. 1506 (2010).

ReversedNT

Sentence
Pending After
Retrial

Johnson v. State, 985 A.2d 904 (Del. 2009), cert. denied,
131 S.Ct. 77 (2010).

Affirmed

Executed

Taylor v. State, 28 A.3d 399 (Del. 2011).

Affirmed

On Row

CASE NAME
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APPENDIX F

TYPES OF ERROR DETECTED IN DELAWARE DEATH PENALTY CASES

Direct
Appeal

Cert. to State Cert. to
Fed.
U.S.
PostU.S.
Hab.
Sup.
Conv.
Sup.
Corp.
Ct.
Relief
Ct.

State
New
Hab.
Trial
Corp. Motion

Total

GUILT PHASE
Prosecutorial
Misconduct
Instructional
Error
Evidentiary Error

3

3

Juror
Qualification or
Selection

1

1

Jury Misconduct

1

1

Other

2

2

Ineffective
Assistance of
Counsel

1

1

New Evidence
PENALTY PHASE
Prosecutorial
Misconduct

1

Instructional
Error

4

Evidentiary Error

3

1
4

1

4

Juror
Qualification or
Selection
Jury Divided
Other

3

Ineffective
Assistance of
Counsel

1

Proportionality

3
1

2

